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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE
DISCONNECTION OF
TERRITORY FRO~I LAYTON
CITY, A MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH.

I

Case No.
12456

\

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT
Respondent agrees with appellant's statement of
the nature of the case and the disposition of the matter
in the lower court. Respondent does not agree with appellant's statement of facts except that, as in appellant's
Brief, reference in this Brief to petitioner refers to Robert D. Sawyer since he was the principal agent and manager for the partnership owner of the tract in question.
Hespondent also agrees that in March, 1968, petitioner filed this action in the District Court to disconnect
approximately 80 acres from Layton City, and that upon
1

hearing of the action before Honorable John F. Wahl.
quist, the District Court entered an order disconnecting
the 80-acre tract in question. As in appellant's Brief,
reference to the material facts of record is made in the
points of the argument below and will not be duplicated
here.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FACTS SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S
DECISION AND THE APPELLANT CANNOT
SHOW THAT THE DECISION \VAS CLEAR.
LY AND PATENTLY ERRONEOUS.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-4-2 ( 1953) pro·
vides:
If the court finds that the petition was signed
by a majority of the real property owners of the
territory concerned and that the allegations of
the petition are true and that justice and equity
require that such territory or any. part there~!
should be disconnected from such city or town, it
shall appoint three disinterested persons as com·
missioners to adjust the terms upon which such
part shall be so seyered as to any li~bilities of such
city or town that have accrued durn~g the connec·
tion of such part with the corporation, and as to
the mutual property rights of the city or to~
and the territory to be detached. [Emphas1~
added.)

In its earlier rulings regarding disconnection under
this statute, this Court has made it very clear that the de·
2

termination of whether "justice and equity" require disconnection is not to be made by the trial court rotely
deciding whether or not the case falls into one of the
"categories" of past cases, but rather by assessing all the
facts of the instant case to determine in which direction
the scales of justice tip. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. City
of Bingham Canyon, 18 Utah 2d 60, 415 P.2d 209, 211
(1966); In re Chief Consolidated Mining Co., 71 Utah
4<30, 266 P. 1044, 1046 ( 1928). No one would question
appellant's contention that this gives the trier of fact
wide discretion, but our judicial system has long placed
the primary responsibility for resolving issues which require a balancing of all the facts upon the trier of fact
who sees the evidence presented at trial.
In the instant case a hearing was held wherein the
parties which could be benefited or damaged by the
subject disconnection presented evidence to support
their respective positions. The trial court weighed all the
eyidence and concluded that the advantages of disconnection to all concerned clearly outweighed the disadvantages, and that therefore, justice and equity would
best be served by granting the landowner's request. This
Court has ruled in previous disconnection cases that the
appellate court must defer to the trial court's conclusion unless it is clearl.IJ and patently erroneous. In other
words, the granting of disconnection is a f a.ctual determination and unless the facts were so one-sided as to
permit only one conclusion, the trial court's finding
should Le affirmed. On this point, this court in In re
Chief Consolidated ft,finin.r; Company, et al., supra.
stated:
3

"The facts in each case, under well recognized
principles of law, must, to a very large extent
determine that question.
'

"The detennination of the facts upon which
resolution of the is:sues is predicated is primarily
for the trial court. The loss of sales and use tax~s
is not in and of itself sufficient to justify denial of
the petition for disconneetion. In this instance the
court concluded that whatever benefits would result from the denial of the petition were outweighed by the advantages to be gained by granting it, which justified the judgment it rendered
in favor of the plaintiff. Under traditional rule.s
of review that judgment must not be disturbed
inasmuch as it is not made to appear that it was
clearly and patently erroneous." [Emphasis added.]
The appellant, by the assertions it makes in its Brief
regarding the present status of the land in question and
the municipal services presently available to it from the
City of Layton, has completely disregarded a number of
important facts to which the parties stipulated prior to
the commencement of trial, including the following:
l. That there presently are no roads (except for an

unimproved county road on the easterly boundary), im·
provements or buildings upon the land involved in this
action (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the sub·
j ect territory") ;
2. That Layton City pr<>Yides no water, garbage

service or sewer service to the ~uhject territory;
4

3. That the nearest Layton City water line runs
approximately 400 feet from the border of the subject
property;

That the East Layton Township is presently proYiding sewer and water service to the subject territory.
(Pretrial Order R. 23-27.)
4.

The conclusion of the trial court that disconnection
should be allowed in this case is amply supported by the
facts established of record. The subject territory is located approximately three miles, as the crow flies, from
the downtown Layton City area ( T. 29); it is approximately 11/~ miles between the subject territory and any
existing tract development in Layton (T. 30). At all
times pertinent, the subject territory has been used
strictly as farming land, on which petitioner raised a
little wheat and oats (T. 36). The land is still essentially
agricultural land on which there are no roads and no
water or sewer lines extending to the property from
Layton; the nearest Layton sewer line is at least a mile
away (T. 35-36). The Layton City Attorney candidly
admitted that the subject territory is, in fact, undeveloped, and that it contains no inhabitants (T. 12).
The subject territory ·was not within the limits of
Layton City when the city was incorporated, but was
subsequently annexed by Layton; the property owner's
consent to the annexation was not sought or obtained and
Layton City almost by happenstance annexed only half
the property owner's parcel, putting the city line right
down the middle of that parcel (T. 17).
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Petitioner testified that for any feasible develop.
ment of the property, the land must have available sewer
~nd water service and roads and other services coming
mto the community in a convenient manner; it must have
power, telephones, gas, garbage collection, snow removal, police protection and fire protection ( T. i3-24).
The petitioner had preliminary discussions with Layton
City officials as early as 1960 with respect to the pros·
pects of obtaining city sewer and water services for the
subject territory (T. 18-19). During these early discussions, petitioner was informed that Layton City had a
1960 l\Iaster Plan which called for roads and improvements and also the provision of water and sewer service
to the subject territory. Some fiYe years thereafter, and
in reliance upon Layton City's Master Plan for such
roads, improvements and services, the petitioner pur·
chased the subject territory ('I'. 20).
After the petitioner acquired the subject property,
he again contacted Layton City officials with respect to
the possible development of the parcel and the available
services to that area. In 1967, he conferred with Byron
.McGregor, Layton City Engineer, and was told that he
could not commence development of the area, i.e., that
there were no sewer or water services available at that
time. McGregor indicated Layton had "nothing in the
immediate area or plans at the time" (T. 30-31). Peti·
tioner, at the time of this 19()7 meeting with McGregor,
made notes on a drawing of the parcel, and those note!
show that McGregor informed petitioner that the onl)·
possibility of getting water to the parcel was by the re·
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activation of an old water main coming from a reservoir
a considerable distance from the parcel; that Layton
could only, even with such reactivation of the old line,
bring water to the northwest corner of the parcel (Exhibit E); an<l that Layton had "no intention of running
a sewer line" into the subject territory at that time (T.
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At the time Call Engineering Company was developing plans for water and sewer service to the subject
territory, representatiYcs of Call were also advised that
there was no service available to that area from the City
of Layton ( T. 91-92). Call Engineering went ahead and
developed feasible service plans, and petitioner and the
Town of East Layton implemented them. As a result,
the subject territory presently has adequate water available to it from a 10-inch main which runs parallel to
Cherry Lane in the East Layton portion of the parcel;
it was designed and has the capacity to handle any residential development of the area ( T. 27-28). The territory is also presently being served by a natural drainage
sewer system having the capacity to service all of the
subject territory and the entire foothill area to the east
(T. 26-29, 92-9.J.). Expert testimony was heard to the
effect that any sewer system now proposed by Layton
would be duplicitous and that the water system proposed
by Layton, utili:ting standby power and pump stations,
would not only be unnecessary, but undesirable from an
engineering standpoint ('I'. ;38-4<0, 8G-87, 102).
The petitionn testified that it would be difficult, if
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not impossible, to develop a projeet which straddled a
line between two cities or towns ( T. 40-44). It was his
judgment that dealing with two taxing bodies would
create a "complicated situation" and if one sewer or
water system was used to serve both sides of the line, the
non-residents of the city providing the service would
likely be charged substantially greater rates than the
residents. He further pointed out that building restric·
tions, zoning ordinances, etc. would be different and all
plans and specifications would have to be approved by
both townships im·olved (T. 43-44). Expert testimony
also established that development of the parcel in two
separate cities would create substantial engineering prob·
lems (T. 95-97, 110). The engineer for East Layton
testified "it would be folly" to try to supply necessary
services to the development from a city on each side (1'.
115). He testified further that duplicative facilities
would be extremely costly (T. 115-116).
East Layton officials testified that if disconnection
were disallowed, East Layton would charge the Layton
residents of the project utility service fees "double the
standard fee for any resident ... simply because they
pay no tax base to it" (T. 119-120). Those same officials
also testified that East Layton presently offers all con·
ventional municipal services to that portion of the sub·
ject territory lying withiu the boundary of East Layton,
i.e., sewer, water, fire, police, etc. (T. 120-121); and that
East Layton cont>trncted the existing sewer and water
lines with the in'ent of sening the entire parcel involved
here (T. 122).

8

None of the subject territory has to date been
platted. The only recorded plat is on 11 lots in the southern half of the whole parcel, which part was in East
Layton c\·en before the disconnection (T. 18).
The development proposed for the subject territory
is "planned unit development" where the residential areas
are clustered together and large common areas are left
available for parks, drives and recreation areas (T. 2021). Petitioner testified that it is particularly important,
in carrying out planned unit development, that an area
be developed as one parcel, since common walls, yards
and other common areas cannot be divided by a city line
( T. 21-22). East Layton has approved zoning ordinances
allowing for the planned unit development contemplated
by petitioner, whereas Layton City's present ordinances
would not permit such development (T. 40 and Stipulated Fact, Pretrial Order p. 25).
At the trial below, Layton City officials attempted
to justify their previous unwillingness to supply needed
senices to the subject territory by testifying that the
services sought by petitioner "would be available" to that
property if and when it was developed ('l'. 147-149).
Such testimony is completely self-serving and rather incredible in light of the fact that Layton was aware from
at least 1967 that petitioner desired to go ahead with development as soon as the necessary services were available, and Layton still did absolutely nothing. Such testimony is also in eurious conflict with the evidence addueed below that there are residents of Layton residing

9

in an area east of the subject territory to whom Layton
even now ref uses to offer any sewer and water service
(T. 137-138).
The trial record indicates that the City of Layton
obviously does not rely on this land becoming valuable
residential property in the near future, i.e., it has no
water or sewer plans, nor has it incurred any bonding or
other obligations relating to such potential use. Since the
subject territory is located on the outermost boundary
of Layton City, and there is no chance of the city expanding all around the property, thus making it an
"island," the fact of potential residential use is irrelevant,
and only its existing nature is important here.
To date, petitioner has invested over $400,000.00 in
his project and Layton City has contributed nothing to
that development ( T. 45). The tax loss to Layton City
from disconnection is minimal, as petitioner pays under
$500 a year property tax on the 80 acres, and the land
is not a source of revenue to Layton City except for those
taxes ( T. 36-37) .
Petitioner testified that Layton has done nothing to
implement its 1960 Master Plan with respect to the subject territory (T. 37); that the only roads into the area
have been developed by the petitioner and not by Layton
City ( T. 164) ; and that in his judgment, Layton renders no significant municipal services to the subject ter·
ritory and confers no benefits upon it (T. 37).
Petitioner testified that, all things considered, he
preferred to have the subject territory disconnected from
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Layton City and developed as part of the East Layton
Township ( T. 46). Appellant, in its Brief (p. 13) makes
the statement that "there is not a single precedent either
in Utah law or any case from any other state known to
the city's counsel or submitted to the court by petitioner's
counsel" supporting the trial court's consideration of the
owner's preference as a key factor. However, one of the
very cases cited by appellant, Creery v. Town of Okoboji, 253 N."\V. 810 (Iowa 1934) clearly establishes that
this is one of the four factors to be weighed by the court
(albeit to a lesser extent than the others) . Any claimed
paucity of authority on this point undoubedly arises from
the simple premise that a landowner's preference for disconnection from one city and/ or annexation to another
city can be assumed from the mere fact of his petition.
Hespondent submits that where, as here, each of
two towns claims to be able to serve the subject territory,
and no real damage will result to the town from which
the property is severed, and there is no sound reason for
preserving the boundary line status quo, the landowner's
expressed preference to be in one town and not the other
should be accorded considerable weight.

POINT II
AX ACTION FOR DISCON~ECTION OFTERHITOHY FHOM A CITY IS NOT DETERJ\IIN.ED BY ATTE~IPTING TO FIT THE APPLICATION "'ITHIN ONE OR T'VO LIMIT11

ED CATEGORIES, llUT RATHER llY THE
COURT'S APPRAISAL OF \\THAT IS THE
MOST JUST AND EQUITABLE RESULT IN
LIGHT OF ALL Tl-IE FACTS IN EVIDENCE.
'Vhile appellant correctly states in its Brief that
the standard of "justice and equity" expressed in Section 10-4-2 U.C.A. ( 1953) is given form and content by
past decisions of this court, appellant incorrectly attempts
to limit the application of that standard to the static
factual situations presented in those prior cases.
Past decisions are obviously instructive, for similar
facts in cases with similar results tend to rebut any claim
of clear and patent error. However, appellant's characterization of Utah cases granting disconnection as all
falling within one or two categories is a gross over-simplification. These decisions were all made on a case-bycase evaluation of all the facts presented, and while cer·
tain facts may be present in more than one case, such
facts cannot be viewed as a determinative legal standard.
Rather than try to "categorize" these cases as all involving or not involving certain facts, one should examine
them to see what kinds of facts are properly considered
in determining the justice and equity issue in a discon·
nection proceeding.
In Young v. Salt Lake Cit;tJ, 24 Utah 321, 67 Pac.
1066 (1902), the court found that justice and equity
warranted disconnection where the facts showed the land
to be unplatted, five miles from the business section of
the city, unable to receive any municipal benefits, and
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"unfit for municipal or residential purposes." It is interesting to note that the land at that time deemed "unfit" for residential use is situated in the foothills just
north of Emigration Canyon in Salt Lake County, an
area which undoubtedly would warrant a different conclusion today as to its fitness for such use.
The potential of land to become residential property
when at the time of the disconnection proceedings it has
not been so used, is only relevant if ( 1) it is apparent
that disconnection of the land will create a hiatus or
island within the city, making service to the surrounding
area more difficult, or ( 2) foe city has somehow relied
to its detriment on the property being so used in the near
future. Certainly, if the residential area of the city is
likely to expand all around the proposed disconnected
property, making sewer and water systems, police and
fire services, etc. more difficult, the potential residential
use is important. In the instant case, however, the subject
territory is on the outermost boundary of Layton City
and there is no chance of the city expanding all around
the property. Layton City simply does not have the risk
of someday being forced to service around an "island" if
this land is allO"wed to be severed. Furthermore, the record demonstrates that Layton City has only minimal
financial obligations, and none of these were specifically
incurred in reliance upm the future residential potential
of the subject territory. (See R. 38 and 43).
The absence in tlie instant case of any sound or accepted reason for maintaining the boundary line in its
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status quo, makes it apparent that the appellant's strenuous argument to deny disconnection because of the potential residential use of this land is centered on appellant's desire to receive future tax revenues from the subject territory. This has been ruled by this court to be an
invalid reason for denying disconnection. Kennecott
Copper Corp. v. Cty of Bingham, 18 Utah 2<l 60, 415
P.2d 204 ( 1966); and Application of Peterson, 92 Utah
212, 66 P.2d 1195 ( 1937). \Vhere, as here, the city has
not serviced the subject territory, nor obligated itself to
do so, and disconnection will not make service to the rest
of the city more expensive, the additional revenues are
unnecessary because the area serviced is not increased.
This court granted severance in the next three cases
following Young. In re Fullmer, 33 Utah 43, 92 Pac.
768 ( 1907); Christensen v. 'Town of Clearfield, 66 Utah
-155, 243 Pac. 376 ( 1926); and In re Town of Smithfield,
70 Utah 564, 262 Pac. 105 ( 1927). In Fullmer and
Smithfield, the appellants' arguments that the evidence
did not support the fin dings received only slight consid·
eration. In both cases, the trial court's decision to dis·
connect \Vas summarily affirmed because the evidence
was found to be ample to support a finding that the land
did not receiYe any direct or appreciable benefit from
being within the city. In Christensen, the court was more
explicit in spelling out such a lack of benefits or services,
stating that, just as here, the land was agricultural, one
to two miles from the business section, not platted for
any municipal purpose, not within the city water servi~es
and without city sidewalks, curbs, gutters, fire and pohce
service.
14

One of the reasons Layton seeks to retain the subject territory is a fear that this case may start a trend
along Layton's eastern border of landowners seeking to
disconnect from Layton and be annexed by East Layton. In Application uf Peterson, 92 Utah 212, 66 P.2d
1195 ( rnH7), this court rejected such a "domino theory,"
stating:
"That the owners of other agricultural lands
may seek to have their lands withdrawn from the
corporate limits is a question which can be met in
the proper way when that question arises, if it
eyer does." 66 P.2d at 1197.
In the Peterson case, the land was located on the
western boundary of the town, was agricultural in character, had neYer been used for any other purpose than
to raise hay and other farm products, and it had no
buildings upon it except a small shack. Furthermore,
although the town had a sewer system, it was located at
too high an elevation to serve any portion of the severed
lands. City water was available to the land but could be
more conyeniently provided from a privately owned system. The nearest water fire hydrant maintained by the
town was about a mile distant. The land was about a mile
from the business section of town. There was no paving
or sidewalks or other improvements abutting or near the
land. The case was unique in that the city had financially
obligated itself for sewer and water systems while the
land was within the l'ity. The court still allowed disconnection since the obligations were incurred after the application and as indicated, it was not feasible to use the
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city's systems to serve the land. The court also noted that
no island or hiatus would occur from granting severance
and that the city's loss of potential tax revenue was not a
proper ground for denial.
The facts as found in Peterson are almost identical
to those in the instant case, and the facts that differ sup.
port disconnection. The court's reasoning in that case
should be highly persuasive on this appeal.
The most recent Utah cases in point are Howard v.
Town of North Salt Lake, 7 Utah 2d 278, 323 P.2d 261
( 1958) and Kennecott Copper Corp. v. City of Bing·
ham, 18 Utah 2d 60, 415 P.2d 209 ( 1966). In both these
cases the court granted severance. In Howard, the court
found that the town water system did not extend into
the disconnected area. The water system of Layton City
does not extend into the subject territory in the instant
case (Stipulated Fact, R. 25). The court also found in
the Haward case that the only structures which were
upon the disonnected territory consisted of the building~
and facilities of the owners of the land. The court found
that there were no sidewalks, curbs or gutters within the
involved area. There are no sidewalks, curbs or gutters
within the involved area in the instant case (Stipulated
Fact, R. 25). The court further found that two principal
roads traversed the area. There are no roads upon the
subject territory in the instant case (Stipulated Fact, R.
25). The court in the II award case found that there wn~
no evidence that the police of ~ orth Salt Lake did an)'
patrolling in the involved area. Furthermore, the court
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found that no garbage removal was conducted by the
town in the disconnected area. These facts are the same
in the instant case (Stipulated Fact, R. 25 and T. 44 and
12..J.). It is significant that the same judge who tried the
instant case, Hon. John F. 'Vahlquist, was also the trial
judge in the Howard case.
In the Kennecott case, the City of Bingham's ordinances were making expansion of mining operations difficult and Kennecott Copper applied to have the land
severed from the city. The severed property was 90 per
cent of the city's area, yet the court still found justice
and equity supported the de~ire of the landowner since
at the time of the application there were no inhabitants
in the severed area, and thus, no city benefits running to
the property.
This court has established in the foregoing cases the
clear proposition that when land is distant from the business center of a community, has no improvements upon
it, receiYes no water from the town, has no dwellings
thereon, has no inhabitants, receives very few services
from the community, is not particularly necessary for the
present or future needs of the community, and there is
no interdependent relationship between the property in
question and the community, then disconnection of the
property should be allowed.
Out of all the Utah decisions on the issue of severance, only in one instance has the landowner's request
been denied. In re Chief Comolidated Mininy Co., 71
Utah 430, 2fHi Pac. 104-t. ( 1928), involved an applica-
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tion by the operator of a mine to have some of its land
disconnected from the city limits of .Mammoth City.
\-Vhile the request was granted for the lands that did not
contain any mines, it was denied as to severance of the
mining lands. This decision is not based on the nature of
the lands being non-agricultural, as appellant implies in
its Brief, but rather on the fact that the city and the mine
were so integrated with and interdependent upon one
another that severance would have been extremely unjust. The mine was the only reason the town existed.
Virtually every resident of the city worked for the owner
of the mining property and the court refused, quite properly, to let the employer free itself from supporting a
city it created and relied on. It is clear that the facts in
the instant case are completely different from those
present in the C onsolidatcd ~lining case. In this case, as
the trial court found, there is a complete absence of any
significant interdependence between the subject territory
and the City of Layton. For that reason, the Consolidated ~fining case is of no aid to the appellant here.
POINT III
APPELLANT'S AC T H 0 RI T I E S FROM
OTHER JURISDICTIONS ARE INAPPOSITE
TO THE INSTANT CASE.
The cases appellant cites to the court from other
jurisdictions are inapposite and of no authoritative value
here. The two Iowa cases [Iowa P ~ L Co. v. Incorpo·
rated 1-'own of Pleasant Hill, 112 N."T· 2d 304 (Iowa
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1962), and Creery v. Town of Okoboji, 253 N.W. 810

(Iowa 1934) ] cited by appellant are totally unreliable as
authority because the Iowa statute is crucially different
from Utah's. Under Iowa law. a petition for severance
must be denied if the city "is capable of extending into
such territory substantial municipal services." Iowa p
~ L Co. v. Incorporated Town of Pleasant Hill, supra.
In Utah, while capability of service is a factor to be considered in the balance, it by no means is determinative. In
addition, the Creery case involved a potential hiatus and
unlike here, there was no adjacent city the petitioner
was seeking severance to join. Thus, the owner's desire
would have resulted in a strip of county land, bisecting
the city. This is hardly analogous to changing the boundary line between two cities.

Shelton Grain and Supply Co. v. Village of Shelton,
134 N.,V. 2d 815 (Neb. 1965), also concerned a landowner who was seeking to disconnect his land from towns
altogether, not deannexation from one to join another,
and thus this case offers no unique insight on the instant
one. This case is further distinguishable because Nebraska law provides a trial de nova in its Supreme
Court for seyerance cases. Therefore, this case does not
mean petitioner's grounds for severance were rejected as
much as it means they were not proved in accordance
with X ebraska' s statutes.
"Thile appellant's statement of Brooks v. City of
South Siou.r Ji'alh, 73 N.,V. 2d 339 (S.D. 1955) is correet as far as it goes, two distinguishing facts were left
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out by appellant. First, the petitioner's land was the only
good residential land left within which a rapidly grow.
ing city could expand because of a river, railroad, and an
industrial area on all other sides. Second, while the case
involved two cities sharing a common boundary, the peti.
tioner made no claim that he would join the City of
Sioux Falls if the court severed him from South Sioux
Falls. Thus, the court was faced with a situation of an
"island" of county land in the middle of two cities should
it grant the disconnection.
Finally, In 1·e Alteration uf Lines, Etc., 95 A.2d
506 (Pa. 1953) is totally irrelevant. This case concerned
an attempt to achieve a severance and annexation ofter·
ritory under a statute designed to settle boundary dis·
putes. The court merely held that this statute was in·
applicable to severance and thus could not affect it.
Appellant's reliance upon cases where disconnection
would have created unregulated, untaxed and unpro·
tected "islands," is completely misplaced. In this case the
trial court was most careful to insure that its deannexa·
tion order would not create such an "island" out of the
subject territory. The order of disconnection was M
pressly conditioned npon the petitioner making applica·
tion for annexation of the property by the Town of East
Layton (R. 43 and T. 212). That application was made
and was approved, and the subject territory has now
been formaJly annexed to the Town of East Layton (R
M5-47).
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CONCLUSION
The Utah courts liave always decided deannexation
ca~es by balancing all the facts and circumstances on a
case-by-case basis to determine if justice and equity
would best be served by granting or denying the severance request. Since the trial court's decision must be
based primarily upon facts presented at the hearing, its
findings and conclusions should he given considerable
deference by this court, and its decision should not be
reversed unless clearly and patently erroneous. In this
case a trial judge of considerable experience in disconnection cases carefully weigh~d all of the evidence and
came to the conclusion that the petitioner had established
the allegations of his petition and that justice and equity
required that disconnection be granted. It is respectfully
submitted that the decision of the trial court was not
clearly and patently erroneous and should, therefore, be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD ,V. GIAUQUE
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall
& McCarthy
Suite 300, 141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondents
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